A Restricted Black-box Adversarial Framework Towards Attacking Graph
  Embedding Models by Chang, Heng et al.
A Restricted Black-box Adversarial Framework
Towards Attacking Graph Embedding Models
Heng Chang
Tsinghua University
changh17@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Yu Rong
Tencent AI Lab
yu.rong@hotmail.com
Tingyang Xu
Tencent AI Lab
Tingyangxu@tencent.com
Wenbing Huang
Tencent AI Lab
hwenbing@126.com
Honglei Zhang
Tencent AI Lab
zhanghonglei@gatech.edu
Peng Cui
Tsinghua University
cuip@tsinghua.edu.cn
Wenwu Zhu
Tsinghua University
wwzhu@tsinghua.edu.cn
Junzhou Huang
University of Texas at Arlington
jzhuang@uta.edu
Abstract
With the great success of graph embedding model on both academic and industry
area, the robustness of graph embedding against adversarial attack inevitably
becomes a central problem in graph learning domain. Regardless of the fruitful
progress, most of the current works perform the attack in a white-box fashion: they
need to access the model predictions and labels to construct their adversarial loss.
However, the inaccessibility of model predictions in real systems makes the white-
box attack impractical to real graph learning system. This paper promotes current
frameworks in a more general and flexible sense – we demand to attack various
kinds of graph embedding model with black-box driven. To this end, we begin
by investigating the theoretical connections between graph signal processing and
graph embedding models in a principled way and formulate the graph embedding
model as a general graph signal process with corresponding graph filter. As such, a
generalized adversarial attacker: GF-Attack is constructed by the graph filter and
feature matrix. Instead of accessing any knowledge of the target classifiers used
in graph embedding, GF-Attack performs the attack only on the graph filter in a
black-box attack fashion. To validate the generalization of GF-Attack, we construct
the attacker on four popular graph embedding models. Extensive experimental
results validate the effectiveness of our attacker on several benchmark datasets.
Particularly by using our attack, even small graph perturbations like one-edge
flip is able to consistently make a strong attack in performance to different graph
embedding models.
1 Introduction
Graph embedding models [1, 2], which elaborate the expressive power of deep learning on graph-
structure data, have achieved promising success in various domains, such as predicting properties
over molecules [3], biology analysis [4], financial surveillance [5] and structural role classification [6].
Given the increasing popularity and success of these methods, a bunch of recent works have posed
the risk of graph embedding models against adversarial attacks, just like what the researchers are
anxious for convolutional neural networks [7]. A strand of research works [8, 9, 10] have already
shown that various kinds of graph embedding methods, including Graph Convolutional Networks,
DeepWalk, etc., are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Undoubtedly, the potential attacking risk is
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Figure 1: The overview of whole attack procedure of GF-Attack. Given target vertices 5 and 7, our
proposed GF-Attack aims to misclassify them by attacking the graph filter and producing adversarial
edges (edge e45 deleted and edge e78 added ) on graph structure.
rising for modern graph learning systems. For instance, by sophisticated constructed social bots and
following connections, it’s possible to fool the recommendation system equipped with the graph
embedding models to give wrong recommendations.
Regarding the amount of information from both target model and data required for the generation
of adversarial examples, all graph adversarial attackers fall into three categories (arranged in an
ascending order of difficulties):
• White-box Attack (WBA): the attacker can access any information, namely, the training
input (e.g., adjacency matrix and feature matrix), the label, the model parameters, the
predictions, etc.
• Practical White-box Attack (PWA): the attacker can any information except the model
parameters.
• Restrict Black-box Attack (RBA): the attacker can only access the training input and limited
knowledge of the model. The access of parameters, labels and predictions is prohibited.
Despite the fruitful results [11, 9, 12] which absorb ingredients from exiting adversarial methods
on convolutional neural networks, obtained in attacking graph embeddings under both WBA and
PWA setting, however, the target model parameter as well as the labels and predictions are seldom
accessible in real-life applications. In the other words, the WBA and PWA attackers are almost
impossible to perform a threatening attack to real systems. Meanwhile, current RBA attackers are
either reinforcement learning based [8], which has low computational efficiency and is limited to
edge deletion, or derived merely only from the structure information without considering the feature
information [10]. Therefore, how to perform the effective adversarial attack toward graph embedding
model relying on the training input, a.k.a., RBA setting, is still more challenging yet meaningful in
practice.
The core task of the adversarial attack on graph embedding model is to damage the quality of output
embeddings to harm the performance of downstream tasks within the manipulated features or graph
structures, i.e., vertex or edge insertion/deletion. Namely, finding the embedding quality measure
to evaluate the damage of embedding quality is vital. For the WBA and PWA attackers, they have
enough information to construct this quality measure, such as the loss function of the target model.
In this vein, the attack can be performed by simply maximize the loss function reversely, either
by gradient ascent [8] or a surrogate model [9, 12] given the known labels. However, the RBA
attacker can not employ the limited information to recover the loss function of the target model, even
constructing a surrogate model is impossible. In a nutshell, the biggest challenge of the RBA attacker
is: how to figure out the goal of the target model barely by the training input.
In this paper, we try to understand the graph embedding model from a new perspective and propose
an attack framework: GF-Attack, which can perform adversarial attack on various kinds of graph
embedding models. Specifically, we formulate the graph embedding model as a general graph signal
processing with corresponding graph filter which can be computed by the input adjacency matrix.
Therefore, we employ the graph filter as well as feature matrix to construct the embedding quality
measure as a T -rank approximation problem. In this vein, instead of attacking the loss function, we
aim to attack the graph filter of given models. It enables GF-Attack to perform attack in a restrict
black-box fashion. Furthermore, by evaluating this T -rank approximation problem, GF-Attack is
2
capable to perform the adversarial attack on any graph embedding models which can be formulate
to a general graph signal processing. Meanwhile, we give the quality measure construction for four
popular graph embedding models (GCN, SGC, DeepWalk, LINE). Figure 1 provides the overview
of whole attack procedure of GF-Attack. Empirical results show that our general attacking method
is able to effectively propose adversarial attacks to popular unsupervised/semi-supervised graph
embedding models on real-world datasets without access to the classifier.
2 Related work
For explanation of graph embedding models, [13] and [14] show some insights on the understanding
of Graph Convolutional Networks and sampling-based graph embedding, respectively. However, they
focus on proposing new graph embedding frameworks in each type of methods rather than building
up a theoretical connection.
Only recently adversarial attacks on deep learning for graphs have drawn unprecedented attention
from researchers. [8] considers adversarial attacks on both graph classification and node classification
and exploits a reinforcement learning based framework under RBA setting. However, they restrict
their attacks on edge deletions only for node classification, and do not evaluate the transferability. [9]
proposes attacks based on a surrogate model and they can do both edge insertion/deletion in contrast
to [8]. But their method utilizes additional information from labels, which is under PWA setting and
in contrast to our method. Further, [12] utilizes meta-gradients to conduct attacks under black-box
setting by assuming the attacker uses a surrogate model same as [9]. Their performance highly
depends on the assumption of the surrogate model, and also requires label information. Moreover,
they focus on the global attack setting. [10] considers a different adversarial attack task on vertex
embeddings under RBA setting. Inspired by [14], they maximize the loss obtained by DeepWalk with
matrix perturbation theory while only consider the information from adjacent matrix. In contrast,
we focus on semi-supervised learning on node classification combined with features. Remarkably,
despite all above-introduced works except [8] show the existence of transferability in graph embedding
methods by experiments, they all lack theoretical analysis on the implicit connection. In this work,
for the first time, we theoretically connect different kinds of graph embedding models and propose a
general optimization problem from parametric graph signal processing. An effective algorithm is
developed afterwards under RBA setting.
3 Preliminary
Let G(V, E) be an attributed graph, where V is a vertex set with size n = |V| and E is an edge
set. Denote A ∈ {0, 1}n×n as an adjacent matrix containing information of edge connections
and X ∈ Rn×l as a feature matrix with dimension l. Dii =
∑
j Aij refers the degree matrix.
vol(G) =
∑
i
∑
j Aij =
∑
iDii denotes the volume of G. For consistency, we denote the perturbed
adjacent matrix asA′ and the normalized adjacent matrix as Aˆ = D−
1
2AD−
1
2 . Symmetric normalized
Laplacian and random walk normalized Laplacian are referred as Lsym = In −D− 12AD− 12 and
Lrw = In −D−1A, respectively.
Given a graph embedding model MΘ parameterized by Θ and a graph G(V, E), the adversarial
attack on graph aims to perturb the learned vertex representation Z = MΘ(A,X) to damage the
performance of the downstream learning tasks. There are three components in graphs that can be
attacked as targets:
• Attack on V: Add/delete vertices in graphs. This operation may change the dimension of
the adjacency matrix A.
• Attack on A: Add/delete edges in graphs. This operation would lead to the changes of
entries in the adjacency matrix A. This kind of attack is also known as structural attack.
• Attack on X: Modify the attributes attached on vertices.
Here, we mainly focus on adversarial attacks on graph structureA, since attackingA is more practical
than others in real applications [15].
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3.1 Adversarial Attack Definition
Formally, given a fixed budget β indicating that the attacker is only allowed to modify 2β entries in
A (undirected), the adversarial attack on a graph embedding modelMΘ can be formulated as [10]:
arg max
A′
L (A′, Z) (1)
s.t. Z =MΘ(A′, X),
Θ∗ = arg min
Θ
L(Θ;A′, X), ‖A′ −A‖ = 2β,
where Z is the embedding output of the modelMΘ and L(·, ·) is the loss function minimized by
Θ. L (A′, Z) is defined as the loss measuring the attack damage on output embeddings, lower
loss corresponds to higher quality. For the WBA, L (A′, Z) can be defined by the minimization
of the target loss, i.e., L (A′, Z) = inf
Θ
L(A′, Z). This is a bi-level optimization problem if we
need to re-train the model during attack. Here we consider a more practical scenario: Θ∗ =
arg minΘ L(Θ;A,X) are learned on the clean graph and remains unchanged during attack.
4 Methodologies
Graph Signal Processing (GSP) focuses on analyzing and processing data points whose relations are
modeled as graph [16, 17]. Similar to Discrete Signal Processing, these data points can be treated
as signals. Thus the definition of graph signal is a mapping from vertex set V to real numbers
x : V → R. In this sense, the feature matrix X can be treated as graph signals with l channels. From
the perspective of GSP, we can formulate graph embedding model M : (A,X) → Rn×d as the
generalization of signal processing. Namely, A graph embedding model can be treated as producing
the new graph signals according to graph filterH together with feature transformation:
X˜ =H (X), X ′ = σ(X˜Θ), (2)
where H denotes a graph signal filter, σ(·) denotes the activation function of neural networks,
and Θ ∈ Rl×l′ denotes a convolution filter from l input channels to l′ output channels. H can
be constructed by a polynomial function h(x) =
∑L
i=0 aix
i ∈ Rn×n with graph-shift filter S, i.e.,
X˜ = h(S)X . Here, the graph-shift filter S reflects the locality property of graphs, i.e., it represents a
linear transformation of the signals of one vertex and its neighbors. It’s the basic building blocks
to constructH . Some common choices ofH include the adjacency matrix A and the Laplacian
L = D − A. We call this general model Graph Filter Attack (GF-Attack). GF-Attack introduces
the trainable weight matrix Θ to enable stronger expressiveness which can fuse the structural and
non-structural information.
4.1 Embedding Quality MeasureL (A′, Z) of GF-Attack
According to (2), in order to avoid accessing the target model parameter Θ, we can construct the
restricted black-box attack lossL (A′, Z) by attacking the graph filterH . Recent works [18, 19]
demonstrate that the output embeddings of graph embedding models can have very low-rank property.
Since our goal is to damage the quality of output embedding Z, we establish the general optimization
problem accordingly as a T -rank approximation problem inspired from [14]:
L (A′, Z) = ‖h(S′)X − h(S′)TX‖2F , (3)
where h(S′) is the polynomial graph filter, S′ is the graph shift filter constructed from the per-
turbed adjacency matrix A′. h(S′)T is the T -rank approximation of h(S′). According to low-rank
approximation,L (A′, Z) can be rewritten as:
L (A′, Z) = ‖
n∑
i=T+1
λ′iuiu
T
i X‖F ≤
N∑
i=T+1
‖λ′i‖2F ‖ui‖2F ‖uTi X‖2F ≤
n∑
i=T+1
λ′i
2·
n∑
i=T+1
‖uTi X‖22,
where n is the number of vertices. h(S′) = UΛUT is the eigen-decomposition of the graph filter
h(S′). h(S′) is a symmetric matrix. Λ = diag(λ1, · · · , λn), U = [uT1 , · · · ,uTn ] are the eigenvalue
and eigenvector of graph filter H , respectively, in order of λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn. λ′i is the
corresponding eigenvalue after perturbation. While ‖∑ni=T+1 λiuiuTi X‖ is hard to optimized,
from (4), we can compute the upper bound instead of minimizing the loss directly. Accordingly, the
4
goal of adversarial attack is to maximize the upper bound of the loss reversely. Thus the restrict
black-box adversarial attack is equivalent to optimize:
arg max
A′
n∑
i=T+1
λ′i
2 ·
n∑
i=T+1
‖uTi X‖22, s.t. ‖A′ −A‖ = 2β.
Now our adversarial attack model is a general attacker. Theoretically, we can attack any graph
embedding model which can be described by the corresponding graph filterH . Meanwhile, our
general attacker provides theoretical explanation on the transferability of adversarial samples created
by [9, 12, 10], since modifying edges in adjacent matrix A implicitly perturbs the eigenvalues of
graph filters. In the following, we will analyze two kinds of popular graph embedding methods and
aim to perform adversarial attack according to (4).
4.2 GF-Attack on Graph Convolutional Networks
Graph Convolution Networks extend the definition of convolution to the irregular graph structure and
learn a representation vector of a vertex with feature matrix X . Namely, we generalize the Fourier
transform to graphs to define the convolution operation: gθ ∗x = UgθUTx. To accelerate calculation,
ChebyNet [20] proposed a polynomial filter gθ(Λ) =
∑K
k=0 θkΛ
k and approximated gθ(Λ) by a
truncated expansion concerning Chebyshev polynomials Tk(x):
gθ′ ∗ x ≈
K∑
k=0
θ′kTk(L˜)x, (4)
where L˜ = 2λmaxL − In and λmax is the largest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix L. θ′ ∈ RK is now
the parameter of Chebyshev polynomials Tk(x). K denotes the Kth order polynomial in Laplacian.
Due to the natural connection between Fourier transform and single processing, it’s easy to formulate
ChebyNet to GF-Attack:
Lemma 1. The K-localized single-layer ChebyNet with activation function σ(·) and weight matrix
Θ is equivalent to filter graph signal X with a polynomial filterH =
∑K
k=0 Tk(S) with graph-shift
filter S = 2L
sym
λmax
− In. Tk(S) represents Chebyshev polynomial of order k. Equation (2) can be
rewritten as:
X˜ =
K∑
k=0
Tk(2
Lsym
λmax
− In)X, X ′ = σ(X˜Θ).
Proof. The K-localized single-layer ChebyNet with activation function σ(·) is
σ(
∑K
k=0 θ
′
kTk(2
Lsym
λmax
− In)X). Thus, we can directly write graph-shift filter as S = 2Lsymλmax − In
and linear and shift-invariant filterH =
∑K
k=0 Tk(S).
GCN [21] constructed the layer-wise model by simplifying the ChebyNet with K = 1 and the
re-normalization trick to avoid gradient exploding/vanishing:
X(l+1) = σ
(
D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2X(l)Θ(l)
)
, (5)
where A˜ = A + In and D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij . Θ = {θ(l)1 , ..., θ(l)n } is the parameters in the lth layer and
σ(·) is an activation function.
SGC [22] further utilized a single linear transformation to achieve computationally efficient graph
convolution, i.e., σ(·) in SGC is a linear activation function. We can formulate the multi-layer SGC
as GF-Attack through its theoretical connection to ChebyNet:
Corollary 2. The K-layer SGC is equivalent to the K-localized single-layer ChebyNet with Kth
order polynomials of the graph-shift filter Ssym = 2In − Lsym. Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
X˜ = (2In − Lsym)KX, X ′ = σ(X˜Θ).
5
Proof. We can write the K-layer SGC as (2In − Lsym)KXΘ. Since Θ is the learned parameters by
the neural network, we can employ the reparameterization trick to use (2In−Lsym)K to approximate
the same order polynomials
∑K
k=0 Tk(2In − Lsym) with new Θ˜. Then we rewrite the K-layer
SGC by polynomial expansion as
∑K
k=0 Tk(2In − Lsym)XΘ˜. Therefore, we can directly write the
graph-shift filter Ssym = 2In−Lsym with the same linear and shift-invariant filterH asK-localized
single-layer ChebyNet.
Note that SGC and GCN are identical when K = 1. Even though non-linearity disturbs the explicit
expression of graph-shift filter of multi-layer GCN, the spectral analysis from [22] demonstrated
that both GCN and SGC share similar graph filtering behavior. Thus practically, we extend the
general attack loss from multi-layer SGC to multi-layer GCN under non-linear activation functions
scenario. Our experiments also validate that the attack model for multi-layer SGC also shows
excellent performance on multi-layer GCN.
GF-Attack loss for SGC/GCN. As stated in Corollary 2, the graph-shift filter S of SGC/GCN is
defined as Ssym = 2In − Lsym = D− 12AD− 12 + In = Aˆ + In, where Aˆ denotes the normalized
adjacent matrix. Thus, for K-layer SGC/GCN, we can decompose the graph filterH asH sym =
(Ssym)K = UAˆ(ΛAˆ + In)
KUT
Aˆ
, where ΛAˆ and UAˆ are eigen-pairs of Aˆ. The corresponding
adversarial attack loss for Kth order SGC/GCN can be rewritten as:
arg max
A′
n∑
i=T+1
(λ′
Aˆ′,i + 1)
2K ·
n∑
i=T+1
‖uT
Aˆ′,iX‖22, (6)
where λ′
Aˆ′,i
refers to the ith largest eigenvalue of the perturbed normalized adjacent matrix Aˆ′.
While each time directly calculating λ′
Aˆ′,i
from attacked normalized adjacent matrix A′ will need an
eigen-decomposition operation, which is extremely time consuming, eigenvalue perturbation theory
is introduced to estimate λ′
Aˆ′,i
in a linear time:
Theorem 3. Let A′ = A + ∆A be a perturbed version of A by adding/removing edges and ∆D
be the respective change in the degree matrix. λAˆ,i and uAˆ,i are the ith eigen-pair of eigenvalue
and eigenvector of Aˆ and also solve the generalized eigen-problem AuAˆ,i = λAˆ,iDuAˆ,i. Then the
perturbed generalized eigenvalue λ
′
Aˆ,i
is approximately as:
λ′
Aˆ′,i ≈ λAˆ,i +
uT
Aˆ,i
∆AuAˆ,i − λAˆ,iuTAˆ,i∆DuAˆ,i
uT
Aˆ,i
DuAˆ,i
. (7)
Proof. Please refer to the Appendix.
With Theorem 3, we can directly derive the explicit formulation of λ′
Aˆ′
perturbed by ∆A on adjacent
matrix A.
4.3 GF-Attack on Sampling-based Graph Embedding
Sampling-based graph embedding learns vertex representations according to sampled vertices, vertex
sequences, or network motifs. For instance, LINE [23] with second order proximity intends to learn
two graph representation matrices X ′, Y ′ by maximizing the NEG loss of the skip-gram model:
L =
|V|∑
i=1
|V|∑
j=1
Ai,j
(
log σ(x′Ti y
′
j) + bEj′∼PN [log σ(−x′Ti y′j)]
)
, (8)
where x′i, y
′
i are rows of X
′, Y ′ respectively; σ is the sigmoid function; b is the negative sampling
parameter; PN denotes the noise distribution generating negative samples. Meanwhile, DeepWalk
[24] adopts the similar loss function except that Ai,j is replaced with an indicator function indicating
whether vertices vi and vj are sampled in the same sequence within given context window size K.
From the perspective of sampling-based graph embedding models, the embedded matrix is obtained
by generating training corpus for the skip-gram model from adjacent matrix or a set of random
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Algorithm 1 Graph Filter Attack (GF-Attack) adversarial attack algorithm under RBA setting
Input:
Adjacent Matrix A; feature matrix X; target vertex t;
number of top-T smallest singular values/vectors selected T ; order of graph filterK; fixed budget
β.
Output:
Perturbed adjacent Matrix A′.
1: Initial the candidate flips set as C = {(v, t)|v 6= t}, eigenvalue decomposition of Aˆ = UAˆΛAˆUTAˆ ;
2: for (v, t) ∈ C do
3: Approximate Λ′
Aˆ
resulting by removing/inserting edge (v, t) via Equation (7);
4: Update Score(v,t) from loss Equation (6) or Equation (10);
5: end for
6: Csel ← edge flips with top-β Score;
7: A′ ← A± Csel;
8: return A′
walks. [25, 14] show that Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI) matrices are implicitly factorized
in sampling-based embedding approaches. It indicates that LINE/DeepWalk can be rewritten into a
matrix factorization form:
Lemma 4. [14] Given context window size K and number of negative sampling b in skip-gram, the
result of DeepWalk in matrix form is equivalent to factorize matrix:
M = log
(vol(G)
bK
(
K∑
k=1
(D−1A)k)D−1
)
, (9)
where vol(G) =
∑
i
∑
j Aij =
∑
iDii denotes the volume of graph G. And LINE can be viewed as
the special case of DeepWalk with K = 1.
For proof of Lemma 4, please kindly refer to [14]. Inspired by this insight, we prove that LINE can
be viewed from a GSP manner as well:
Theorem 5. LINE is equivalent to filter a graph signal X = 1b In with a polynomial filterH and
fixed parameters Θ = vol(G)D−1. H = S is constructed by graph-shift filter Srw = In − Lrw.
Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
X˜ =
1
b
(In − Lrw)D−1In, X ′ = log(vol(G)X˜).
Note that LINE is formulated from an optimized unsupervised NEG loss of skip-gram model. Thus,
the parameter Θ and value of the NCG loss have been fixed at the optimal point of the model with
given graph signals.
We can extend Theorem 5 to DeepWalk since LINE is a 1-window special case of DeepWalk:
Corollary 6. The output of K-window DeepWalk with b negative samples is equivalent to filtering a
set of graph signals X = 1b In with given parameters Θ = vol(G)D
−1. Equation (2) can be rewritten
as:
X˜ =
1
bK
K∑
k=1
(In − Lrw)kD−1In, X ′ = log(vol(G)X˜).
Proof of Theorem 5 and Corollary 6. With Lemma 4, we can explicitly write DeepWalk as
exp (M) = vol(G)b (
∑K
k=1
1
K (In − Lrw)kD−1In). Therefore, we can directly have the explicit
expression of Equation (2) on LINE/DeepWalk.
GF-Attack loss for LINE/DeepWalk. As stated in Corollary 6, the graph-shift filter S of DeepWalk
is defined as Srw = In − Lrw = D−1A = D− 12 AˆD 12 . Therefore, graph filter H of the K-
window DeepWalk can be decomposed asH rw = 1K
∑K
k=1(S
rw)k, which satisfiesH rwD−1 =
D−
1
2UAˆ(
1
K
∑K
k=1 Λ
k
Aˆ
)UT
Aˆ
D−
1
2 .
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Table 1: Summary of the change in classification accuracy (in percent) compared to the clean/original
graph. Single edge perturbation under RBA setting. Lower is better.
Dataset Cora Citeseer Pubmed
Models GCN SGC DeepWalk LINE GCN SGC DeepWalk LINE GCN SGC DeepWalk LINE
(unattacked) 80.20 78.82 77.23 76.75 72.50 69.68 69.68 65.15 80.40 80.21 78.69 72.12
Random -1.90 -1.22 -1.76 -1.84 -2.86 -1.47 -6.62 -1.78 -1.75 -1.77 -1.25 -1.01
Degree -2.21 -4.42 -3.08 -12.40 -4.68 -5.21 -9.67 -12.55 -3.86 -4.44 -2.43 -13.05
RL-S2V -5.20 -5.62 -5.24 -10.38 -6.50 -4.08 -12.13 -20.10 -6.40 -6.11 -6.10 -13.21
Aclass -3.62 -2.96 -6.29 -7.55 -3.48 -2.83 -12.56 -10.28 -4.21 -2.25 -3.05 -6.75
GF-Attack -7.60 -9.73 -5.31 -13.27 -7.78 -6.19 -12.50 -22.11 -7.96 -7.20 -7.43 -14.16
Since multiplying D−
1
2 in GF-Attack loss brings extra complexity, [14] provides us a way to well
approximate the perturbed λ′H rwD−1 without this term. Inspired by [14]
1, we can find that both the
magnitude of eigenvalues and smallest eigenvalue ofH rwD−1 are always well bounded. Thus we
can approximate λ′H rwD−1 ≈ 1dminλ′UAˆ( 1K ∑Kk=1 ΛkAˆ)UTAˆ . Therefore, the corresponding adversarial
attack loss of Kth order DeepWalk can be rewritten as:
arg max
A′
n∑
i=T+1
(
1
dmin
| 1
K
K∑
k=1
λ′k
Aˆ′,i|)2 ·
n∑
i=T+1
‖uT
Aˆ′,iX‖22. (10)
When K = 1, Equation (10) becomes the adversarial attack loss of LINE. Similarly, Theorem 3 is
utilized to estimate λ′
Aˆ′
in the loss of LINE/DeepWalk.
4.4 The Attack Algorithm
Now the general attack loss is established, the goal of our adversarial attack is to misclassify a target
vertex t from an attributed graph G(V, E) given a downstream node classification task. We start by
defining the candidate flips then the general attack loss is responsible for scoring the candidates.
We first adopt the hierarchical strategy in [8] to decompose the single edge selection into two ends of
this edge in practice. Then we let the candidate set C for edge selection contains all vertices (edges
and non-edges) directly accessary to the target vertex, i.e. C = {(v, t)|v 6= t}, as [8, 10]. Intuitively,
further away the vertices from target t, less influence they impose on t. Meanwhile, experiments in
[9, 10] also showed that they can do significantly more damage compared to candidate flips chosen
from other parts of the graph. Thus, our experiments are restricted on such candidate flips choices.
Overall, for a given target vertex t, we establish the target attack by sequentially calculating the
corresponding GF-Attack loss w.r.t graph-shift filter S for each flip in candidate set as scores. Then
with a fixed budget β, the adversarial attack is accomplished by selecting flips with top-β scores as
perturbations on the adjacent matrix A of clean graph. Details of the GF-Attack adversarial attack
algorithm under RBA setting is in Algorithm 1.
5 Experiments
Datasets. We evaluate our approach on three real-world datasets: Cora [26], Citeseer and Pubmed
[27]. In all three citation network datasets, vertices are documents with corresponding bag-of-words
features and edges are citation links. The data preprocessing settings are closely followed the
benchmark setup in [21]. Statistical overview of datasets is given in Table 2.
Table 2: Dataset Statistics. Only the largest connected component (LCC) is considered.
Dataset NLCC ELCC Classes Features
Cora 2,485 5,069 7 1,433
Citeseer 2,110 3,757 6 3,703
Pubmed 19,717 44,325 3 500
Baselines. In current literatures, few of studies strictly follow the restricted black-box attack setting.
They utilize the additional information to help construct the attackers, such as labels [9], gradients
[8], etc. Hence, we compare four baselines with the proposed attacker under RBA setting as follows:
1For more details, please kindly refer to Section 3.1 of [14].
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Figure 2: Comparison between order K of GF-Attack and number of layers in GCN/SGC on Citeseer.
• Random [8]: for each perturbation, randomly choosing insertion or removing of an edge in
graph G. We report averages over 10 different seeds to alleviate the influence of randomness.
• Degree [15]: for each perturbation, inserting or removing an edge based on degree centrality,
which is equivalent to the sum of degrees in original graph G.
• RL-S2V [8]: a reinforcement learning based attack method, which learns the generalizable
attack policy for GCN under RBA scenario.
• Aclass [10]: a matrix perturbation theory based black-box attack method designed for
DeepWalk. Then Aclass evaluates the targeted attacks on node classification by learning a
logistic regression.
Target Models. To validate the generalization ability of our proposed attacker, we choose four popular
graph embedding models: GCN [21], SGC [22], DeepWalk [24] and LINE [23] for evaluation. First
two of them are Graph Convolutional Networks and the others are sampling-based graph embedding
methods. For DeepWalk, the hyperparameters are set to commonly used values: window size as
5, number of negative sampling in skip-gram as 5 and top-128 largest singular values/vectors. A
logistic regression classifier is connected to the output embeddings of sampling-based methods for
classification. Unless otherwise stated, all Graph Convolutional Networks contain two layers.
Attack Configuration. A small budget β is applied to regulate all the attackers. To make this
attacking task more challenging, β is set to 1. Specifically, the attacker is limited to only add/delete
a single edge given a target vertex t. For our method, we set the parameter T in our general attack
model as n − T = 128, which means that we choose the top-T smallest eigenvalues for T -rank
approximation in embedding quality measure. Unless otherwise indicated, the order of graph filter in
GF-Attack model is set to K = 2. Following the setting in [9], we split the graph into labeled (20%)
and unlabeled vertices (80%). Further, the labeled vertices are splitted into equal parts for training
and validation. The labels and classifier is invisible to the attacker due to the RBA setting. The attack
performance is evaluated by the decrease of node classification accuracy following [8].
5.1 Attack Performance Evaluation
In the section, we evaluate the overall attack performance of different attackers.
Attack on Graph Convolutional Networks. Table 1 summaries the attack results of different
attackers on Graph Convolutional Networks. Our GF-Attack attacker outperforms other attackers on
all datasets and all models. Moreover, GF-Attack performs quite well on 2 layers GCN with nonlinear
activation. This implies the generalization ability of our attacker on Graph Convolutional Networks.
Attack on Sampling-based Graph Embedding. Table 1 also summaries the attack results of
different attackers on sampling-based graph embedding models. As expected, our attacker achieves
the best performance nearly on all target models. It validates the effectiveness of our method on
attacking sampling-based models. Another interesting observation is that the attack performance on
LINE is much better than that on DeepWalk. This result may due to the deterministic structure of
LINE, while the random sampling procedure in DeepWalk may help raise the resistance to adversarial
attack.
Moreover, GF-Attack on all graph filters successfully drop the classification accuracy on both Graph
Convolutional Networks and sampling-based models, which again indicates the transferability of our
general model in practice.
5.2 Evaluation of Multi-layer Graph Convolutional Networks
To further inspect the transferability of our attacker, we conduct attack towards multi-layer Graph
Convolutional Networks w.r.t the order of graph filter in GF-Attack model. Figure 2 presents the
attacking results on 2, 3, 4 and 5 layers GCN and SGC with different orders, and the number followed
by GF-Attack indicates the graph-shift filter order K in general attack loss.
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From Figure 2, we can observe that: first, the transferability of our general model is demonstrated,
since all graph-shift filters in loss with different order K can perform the effective attack on all
models. Interestingly, GF-Attack-5 achieves the best attacking performance in most cases. It implies
that the higher order filter contains higher order information and has positive effects on attack to
simpler models. Second, the attacking performance on SGC is always better than GCN under all
settings. We conjecture that the non-linearity between layers in GCN successively adding robustness
to GCN.
5.3 Evaluation under Multi-edge Perturbation Settings
In this section, we evaluate the performance of attackers with multi-edge perturbation, i.e. β ≥ 1.
The results of multi-edge perturbations on Cora dataset under RBA setting are reported in Figure 3
for demonstration. Clearly, with the increasing of the number of perturbed edges, the attacking
performance gets better for each attacker. Our attacker outperforms other baselines on all cases. It
validates that our general attacker can still perform well when the fixed budget β becomes larger.
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Figure 3: Multiple-edge attack results on Cora under RBA setting. Lower is better.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the adversarial attack on different kinds of graph embedding models under
restrict black-box attack scenario. From graph signal processing of view, we try to formulate the
graph embeddding method as a general graph signal process with corresponding graph filter and
construct a restricted adversarial attacker which aims to attack the graph filter only by the adjacency
matrix and feature matrix. Thereby, a general optimization problem is constructed by measuring
embedding quality and an effective algorithm is derived accordingly to solve it. Experiments show
the vulnerability of different kinds of graph embedding models to our attack framework.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3. Since λ is an eigenvalue of the normalized adjacent matrix Aˆ = D−
1
2AD−
1
2
with the eigenvector uˆ = D−
1
2u if and only if λ and u solve the generalized eigen-problem
Au = λDu, we can transfer the original estimating eigenvalue of Aˆ into the above generalized
eigen-problem Aui = λiDui.
We denote ∆λ and ∆u as the change in eigenvalues and eigenvectors, respectively. Thus, for a
specific eigen-pair we can have:
(A+ ∆A)(ui + ∆ui) = (λi + ∆λi)(D + ∆D)(ui + ∆ui)
By using the fact that Aui = λiDui, we can have:
A∆ui + ∆Aui + ∆A∆ui
= λiD∆ui + λi∆Dui + λi∆D∆ui
+∆λiDui + ∆λiD∆ui + ∆λi∆Dui + ∆λi∆D∆ui
According to [28], the higher order terms can be removed since they have limited effects on the
solution. Then we can have:
uTi A∆ui + u
T
i ∆Aui
= λiu
T
i D∆ui + λiu
T
i ∆Dui + ∆λiu
T
i Dui
Utilizing the symmetric characteristic of A and D we can have uTi A = λiu
T
i D, we can have:
uTi ∆Aui = λiu
T
i ∆Dui + ∆λu
T
i Dui
By solving this problem, we can obtain the result as:
λ′ ≈ λ+ u
T
i ∆Aui − λiuTi ∆Dui
uTi Dui
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